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SEARS, ROEBUCK & CO. V. SAN DIEGO COUNTY DISTRICT
COUNCIL OF CARPENTERS: GARMON RECONSIDERED AND THE
REAFFIRMATION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
I. INTRODUCTION
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County District Council of
Carpenters' resolves the problem of a jurisdictional hiatus facing an em-
ployer when a union's peaceful picketing on his property is within the
ambit of the National Labor Relations Act 2 (NLRA or the Act). Prior to
the Sears decision, the right of the states to enjoin labor union picketing
on an employer's private property, when the union's picketing was argua-
bly protected and arguably prohibited, was uncertain. As a rule, conduct
which is arguably protected under the Act3 or arguably prohibited under
the Act,4 with few exceptions, cannot be the subject of litigation in state
courts.5 However, on the sensitive issue of picketing on private property,
state court decisions were in disarray with some courts ruling state trespass
laws could be used against union members on private propertyo and other
courts ruling that state jurisdiction was preempted by the NLRA.7 Both
the Warren Court and the Burger Court had left the issue open by consis-
tently refusing to grant certiorari.8
The jurisdictional dilemma which faces an employer in such situations
stems from the fact that the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or
1. 98 S. Ct. 1745 (1978).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 157.
4. 29 U.S.C. § 158.
5. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
6. Taggart v. Weinacker's Inc., 283 Ala. 171, 214 So. 2d 913 (1968), cert. granted, 396 U.S.
813 (1969), cert. dismissed, 397 U.S. 223 (1970); May Dept. Stores Co. v. Teamsters Union
Local No. 743, 64 ll. 2d 153, 355 N.E.2d 7, 384 N.Y.S.2d 733 (1976); People v. Goduto, 21
Ill. 2d 605, 174 N.E.2d 385, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 927 (1961); People v. Bush, 39 N.Y.2d 529,
349 N.E.2d 832 (1976); Moreland Corp. v. Retail Store Employees Union Local No. 444, 16
Wis. 2d 499, 114 N.W.2d 876 (1962).
7. Musicians Union Local No. 6 v. Superior Crt., 69 Cal. 2d 695, 447 P.2d 313, 73 Cal. Rptr.
201 (1968); Shirley v. Retail Store Employees Union, 22 Kan. 373, 565 P.2d 585 (1977);
Broadmoor Plaza v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 21 Ohio Misc. 245, 257 N.E.2d 420 (1969);
Freeman v. Retail Clerks Union Local No. 1207, 58 Wash. 2d 426, 363 P.2d 803 (1961).
8. The issue was originally raised in Amalgamated Meat Cutters Local 427 v. Fairlawn
Meats, Inc., 353 U.S. 20, 24 (1957). Since then the Warren Court denied certiorari on this
issue at least twice. Schwartz-Torrance Inv. Corp. v. Bakery Workers Local 31, 61 Cal. 2d
766, 394 P.2d 921, 40 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 906 (1965); People v.
Goduto, 21111. 2d 605, 174 N.E.2d 385, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 927 (1961). The Burger Court
had one opportunity to rule on the issue but due to changed circumstances a grant of certior-
ari was dismissed as improvidently granted. Taggart v. Weinacker's Inc., 283 Ala. 171, 214
So. 2d 913 (1968), cert. granted 396 U.S. 813 (1969), cert. dismissed 397 U.S. 223 (1970).
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the Board) is precluded from ruling on the legality of peaceful picketing
of an employer's property by a non-employee union until weeks after it has
begun.' Before Sears, an employer who had a valid claim against union
pickets on his property had no forum in which he could pursue litigation.'0
The decision in Sears finally resolves the dilemma in favor of giving state
courts jurisdiction to determine whether the picketing is permissible.
The fact situation of the Sears case presented a classic example of the
jurisdictional problem facing an employer when a non-employee union
picketed his property. This no man's land was the result of a strong federal
preemption doctrine promulgated in the decision of San Diego Building
Trades Council v. Garmon." However, an analysis of the Sears decision
reveals that it is consistent with a trend of reevaluation of the Garmon
doctrine and a shift toward a less strict preemption rule. As shall be
pointed out, the Court's reevaluation of the importance of property rights
is a significant factor diminishing the harshness of the preemption doc-
trine. In the wake of the Sears holding, several questions remain to be
answered regarding the extent to which the Court is willing to allow state
courts to become involved in national labor relations policy.
II. LABOR LAW PREEMPTION PRIOR TO SEARS
Since the passage of the Act, it has been held generally Lhat the federal
government preempts the states in regulating labor-management dis-
putes.' The foundation for federal preemption of the states is the suprem-
9. Peaceful picketing is not prohibited by 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(C) if the union filed a
petition for a representation election within "a reasonable period of time not to exceed thirty
days from the commencement of such picketing." The Board has held that the "reasonable
period of time" clause is not violated after 25 days of picketing. Culinary Workers Local 62
(Tropics Enterprises, Inc.), [1968] 69 L.R.R.M. 1175, 1176.
10. Before the Sears decision the employer had two unattractive alternatives to this juris-
dictional hiatus. First, he could have resorted to "self help" and phySically expelled the
pickets from his property. However this alternative was dangerous because it could incite a
riot or subject the employer to civil liability if more force than necessarl was used.
Second, the employer could have requested the pickets to move which would have been an
unfair labor practice under 29 U.S.C. § 8. 98 S. Ct. 1760, 1763. However, a union could ignore
the request and not file such a charge and the Board would have no way of hearing the
dispute. See Come, Federal Preemption of Labor - Management Relatio.: Current Problems
in the Application of Garmon, 56 VA. L. REV. 1435, 1437-38, 1443 (1970); Cox, Labor Law
Preemption Revisited, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1337, 1362-63 (1972).
11. 359 U.S. 236 (1957).
12. Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S.
274 rehearing denied 404 U.S. 874 (1971); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359
U.S. 236 (1957); Garner v. Teamsters Local Union No. 776, 346 U.S. 485 (1953); Hill v.
Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
[Vol. 13:351
LABOR LAW PREEMPTION RECONSIDERED
acy clause'3 and the federal power to regulate commerce.' 4 The Supreme
Court has ruled that the Act established the NLRB to adjudicate labor
grievances to the exclusion of state labor law remedies.,'
Underlying the establishment of this strong federally oriented Act was
the desire for a uniform national labor policy to promote the full flow of
interstate commerce.'6 One particularly troublesome problem prior to the
passage of the Act was state court abuse of granting injunctions in ex parte
proceedings against labor unions.'17 Hence, the Supreme Court in the pe-
riod following the passage of the NLRA in 1935 until the Garmon decision
attempted to fashion an acceptable preemption doctrine that would free
labor from the restraints of a multitude of diverse state statutes, rulings,
and procedures and, yet, not totally preempt the states in the field of labor
relations.'8 At the same time, the Court attempted to shape a judicial
standard which would be easy to understand and to apply.'"
This effort culminated in the Garmon decision which categorized labor
activity in one of three ways: (1) protected or prohibited, (2) neither pro-
tected nor prohibited, or (3) arguably protected or arguably prohibited. '
In the first category, state courts are clearly preempted from regulating
labor activity.2' If labor activity falls in the second category, the Court
ruled that this narrow area of activities was withdrawn from state regula-
tion.? In an effort to develop uniformity in labor law, the Court ruled that
in conflicts within the. third category, which this comment exclusively
addresses, state and federal courts must defer to the exclusive and primary
jurisdiction of the NLRB.? The states were given the power to regulate
13. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, § 2.
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
15. International Union U.A.W. v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454 (1950).
16. 29 U.S.C. § 141.
17. F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 200-01 (1930); R. GORMAN, BASIC
TEXT ON LABOR LAW 1-2 (1976).
18. "The national Labor Management Relations Act,... leaves much to the states ....
We must spell out from conflicting indications of congressional will the area in which state
action is still permissible." Garner v. Teamsters Local Union No. 776, 346 U.S. 485, 488
(1953); See also Lesnick, Preemption Reconsidered: The Apparent Reaffirmation of Garmon,
72 COLUM. L. REv. 469, 469-72 (1972). For a concise history of the development of the pre-
Garmon labor preemption policy, see Cox supra note 10, at 1340-48.
19. Amalgamated Ass'n. of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S.
274, 290-91 rehearing denied 404 U.S. 874 (1971).
20. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244-46 (1959).
21. Id. at 244.
22. Id. at 246;" See generally Note, Labor Law - Preemption - Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of
Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n (Kearney), 18 B.C. INDUS. & COM.
L. REv. 494 (1977).
23. 359 U.S. at 244-45.
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only those activities which were set out as exceptions to the Garmon doc-
trine - activities that can be described as matters of "peripheral concern"
of the NLRA or conduct which touches interests "deeply rooted in local
feeling and responsibility" [hereinafter referred to as the local interest
exception] .4
Cases that the Supreme Court has deemed to fall within the scope of the
above exceptions involve violent conduct2 and matters which the Act does
not directly address." The decisions allowing state regulation of matters
within the local interest exception or the peripheral concern exception are
aimed at preventing violence or at providing plaintiffs :egal redress for
conduct not within the central focus of the Act. The Garmon test has been
particularly troublesome in the past because it has produced inequitable
results by foreclosing all forums to a plaintiff whose cause of action is valid
but does not fall within the local interest or peripheral concern exceptions
of the Garmon rule.Y This was the situation in the Sears case. Until re-
cently, the inequitites produced by the Garmon rule were viewed by the
Court to be a necessary evil in achieving a national uniform labor policy.'
24. Id. at 243-44.
25. Conduct within the local interest exception usually involves some form of violence or
outrageous conduct. See e.g., Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 430 U.S. 290 (1977)(inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress as a result of union officials engaging in outrageous
conduct, intimidation and threats); International Union U.A.W. v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634
(1958)(employee denied access to employer's plant by a striking unicn engaging in mass
picketing and threats of violence); Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957)(striking
employees engaged in loud and offensive name calling, singing and shouting directed at non-
striking workers); United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656
(1954)(Virginia suit for damages allowed where employer caused to abandon project due to
union agents' threats of violence).
26. Conduct of peripheral concern to the Act is subject to regulation by the states. See e.g.,
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967)(breach of union duty of fair representation suit was not
preempted as it involved issues not usually within NLRB's unfair labor practice jurisdiction);
Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966)(malicious intent in circula-
tion of false and defamatory statements during organizational campaign)(also classified as
local interest exception); Hanna Mining Co. v. District 2, Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n,
382 U.S. 181 (1965)(supervisory picketing enjoinable after Board ruling that supervisors were
not included by the Act's definition of employees); International Asa'n of Machinists v.
Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958) (state court jurisdiction over a purely internal union matter not
affecting employment per se allowed). Cf. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554
(1976)(dictum)(companion suits for breach of the duty of fair representation are not subject
to preemption by the NLRB).
27. This situation has been particularly burdensome on employers. Cox, supra note 10, at
1362-63.
28. Cf. Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403
U.S. 274 (1971). Court ruled that stare decisis and congressional intent were the important
factors in maintaining the Garmon doctrine even though the plaintiff, having a valid claim,
was denied relief by the doctrine's application. Id. at 302.
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The inequity of a jurisdictional hiatus existing up until the Sears ruling
was similar to the inequity of a "no man's land" that existed in the 1950's
when the Supreme Court ruled in Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Boardn
that the states were preempted from exercising jurisdiction over cases
which the Board had jurisdiction but which it had declined to exercise. In
this situation, both unions and management were left without a forum for
litigation where small businesses were unable to meet the Board's jurisdic-
tional standards. Unlike the judicial resolution of the jurisdictional prob-
lem confronting the employer in a Sears situation, Congress resolved the
issue facing labor and management in a Guss situation by enacting section
14(c) of the NLRA1 in 1959.
It is important to note that the Court's labor law preemption policy is
not considered in a legal vacuum. At one point prior to the Sears decision,
the preemption issue in cases involving peaceful picketing was engulfed in
the much larger issue of first and fourteenth amendment rights of labor
pickets and fifth and fourteenth amendment property rights of employ-
ers.3' Although the Court no longer continues to subordinate property
rights in its analysis of peaceful picketing by labor unions," private prop-.
erty rights remain a potent factor in determining the direction of labor law
preemption.33
29. See Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957); Amalgamated Meat Cutters
Local 427 v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc., 353 U.S. 20 (1957).
30. 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(2). Congressional disapproval, of the predicament many litigants
were in, prompted approval of the section. S. RaP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 17, reprinted
in [1959] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws 2318, 2341-43; A. Cox & D. BOK, CASES ON LABOR
LAW 1218-19 (7th ed. 1970).
31. In Amalgamated Food Employees, Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308
(1968) the Court did not address the issue of whether or not the state court was preempted
by the Board when a state court issued an injunction restraining picketing and trespassing
on an employer's property by a non-employee union. The Court, instead, analyzed the prob-
lem in terms of the pickets' first amendment rights to be on the employer's property and the
employer's fifth amendment rights in having the state use its trespass laws to prevent picket-
ing on his private property.
32. In recent decisions the Court has brought the issue of preemption of state courts, a
matter not considered by the Logan Valley Court, back into play by ruling any right a union
might have to picket on the private property of another is divorced from any first amendment
issue and is totally dependent on the NLRA for its existence. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S.
507, 520-22 (1976) (employees' rights under 29 U.S.C. § 157 are to be decided solely under
the criteria of the NLRA without regard to first amendment rights); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,
407 U.S. 551, 562-67 (1972) (property rights are unwarrantedly infringed upon by requiring
them to yield to the exercise of first amendment rights where alternative avenues of commu-
nication exist); Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539, 547 (1972) (private property
must assume to some significant degree attributes of public property before the owner is
subject to first and fourteenth amendment rights).
33. See text, infra at notes 81-88.
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III. THE SEARS DILEMMA
The factual situation of the Sears case presented a classic example of
the dilemma facing an employer when a non-employee union picketed his
property. On October 24, 1973, two business representatives of the San
Diego County District Council of Carpenters visited the Sears store in
Chula Vista, California and determined that certain carpentry work was
being done by men who had not been dispatched by the union hiring hall.-"
The union agents met with the Sears manager that day and requested that
Sears either contract the work through a building trades contractor or sign
a union master labor agreement. The Sears manager did not respond to
either request.
On October 26, the union established picket lines on Sears' property.:
The picketers, carrying signs indicating that they were AFL-CIO pickets
sanctioned by the "Carpenters' Trade Union," patrolled on or near the
private walkway next to the building or in the parking lot immediately
beside the building. The record disclosed no acts of violence, threats of
violence or obstruction of traffic-activity which would allow the state to
act under the local interest exception to the Garmon rule.
The security manager of the store demanded that the union remove the
pickets from Sears' property, and the union refused stating that the pickets
would not move unless forced to by legal action.-" The status of the pickets
was uncertain at the time they were requested to leave. The picketing was
arguably protected by section 737 if the action was to secure compliance by
Sears with area standards.3 Likewise, the picketing was arguably prohib-
ited under section 8(b)(4)(D) "9 if the objective was to force Sears into
assigning its carpentry work away from its employees to union members
or it could have been prohibited under section 8(b)(7)(C)40 if its objective
34. The non-union carpenters were building platforms and other wooden structures for the
store. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County District Council of Carpenters, 17 Cal. 3d
893, 553 P.2d 603, 605, 132 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1976).
35. The Sears store stood on a large rectangular parking lot bordered by a concrete wall
on one end and by public streets on the other three sides. 553 P.2d at 605.
36. At the request to move, the union had the opportunity to bring the issue of their right
to picket before the Board but it did not do so. Sears had no safe way to bring the issue before
the Board. See notes 9 and 10 supra.
37. 29 U.S.C. § 157.
38. International Longshoremen's Assoc., Local 1416 v. Ariadne Shipping Co., 397 U.S.
195, 200-01 (1970).
39. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(D) which provides in relevant part: "It shall be an unfair labor
practice for a labor organization or its agents. . . to threaten. . . an person. . . where an
object. . . is forcing. . . any employer to assign particular work to employees in a particular
labor organization . . . rather than to employees in another . . . classI . ..."
40. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(C) which provides in relevant part: "It shall be an unfair labor
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was to engage in recognitional picketing. Under Garmon, this categoriza-
tion of the activity would have ended the analysis.
On the third day of picketing, Sears, in an ex parte proceeding," ob-
tained a preliminary injunction against the picketing from the Superior
Court of California. The court held that the picketing was neither pro-
tected by state law nor by the first and fourteenth amendments.4 2 The
union promptly removed the pickets to the public sidewalks surrounding
the store and finally discontinued the picketing on November 12 conclud-
ing that it was too far removed from the store to be effective.
3
The California Court of Appeals affirmed the decision" on the grounds
that the picketing was within the local interest exception to the Garmon
rule. The California Supreme Court reversed,"5 holding that the trespass
element was only one factor that the board would consider in determining
whether the union conduct was arguably permisible under section 7. It also
determined that under section 8(b) (7) (C) the union was arguably engaged
in recognitional picketing which the Board might find to be prohibited
conduct. As the Supreme Court had already ruled that protection of pri-
vate property was not within the local interest exception," it ruled that the
superior court was preempted by the NLRA as the conduct was arguably
protected and arguably prohibited.
Sears sought certiorari from the United States Supreme Court'7 and the
Court reversed the decision of the California Supreme Court; Mr. Justice
Stevens, speaking for six members of the Court, opined that the states were
not preempted from using trespass laws to enjoin pickets in the Sears-type
situation. An analysis of the decision reveals two major grounds on which
it was based: (1) that the controversy presented to the state court was
different from that which could have been presented to the Board thereby
practice for a labor organization or its agents ... to picket ... any employer where an object
... is forcing or requiring an employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as
the representative of his employees ... where such picketing has been conducted without a
petition under § 159(c) . . .[to be] filed within a reasonable period of time not to exceed
thirty days from the commencement of such picketing ... "
41. According to Justice Blackmun, the union was not accorded a hearing until November
16, over two weeks after they were enjoined from picketing, to show cause why a preliminary
injunction should not be entered. 98 S. Ct. 1765.
42. 98 S. Ct. 1750, n.3.
43. The nearest street bordering the store was 220 feet away. 52 Cal. App. 3d 690, 125 Cal.
Rptr. 245, 247 (1975).
44. 52 Cal. App. 3d 690, 125 Cal. Rptr. 245.
45. 17 Cal. 3d 893, 553 P.2d 603, 132 Cal. Rptr. 443.
46. Musicians Union, Local No. 6 v. Superior Ct., 69 Cal. 2d 690, 447 P.2d 313, 73 Cal.
Rptr. 201 (1968).
47. Cert. granted, 430 U.S. 905.
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making it proper for the state court to hear it, and (2) that the primary
jurisdiction rationale of Garmon, requiring a state court. to stay its hand
pending Board adjudication, is an insufficient reason for preemption when
the union could have presented the issue to the Board but did not do so
and Sears had no acceptable means of doing so.
Focusing on the arguably prohibited conduct of the union,"8 the Court
ruled that there were two considerations which favored state court jurisdic-
tion. First, the Court held that there was a significant state interest in
protecting Sears from the challenged conduct comparing the conduct to
cases within the local interest exception. 9 Second, the Court held that
since the issue presented before the state court was different from the issue
which would have been presented before the Board" ' there was no risk of
interference with the unfair labor practice jurisdiction of the NLRB. Con-
sidering Sears' inability to invoke the Board's jurisdiction, the Court held
that in section 7 cases involving trespassory union conduct it was probable
that the conduct was not protected." Therefore, the risk of an erroneous
state court decision with regard to the protected nature of the activity is
outweighed by the inequitable result of denying an employer his "day in
court."
A. Federal Oriented Preemption Doctrine Reconsidered
The holding of Sears, albeit contrary to a strong federally oriented
preemption doctrine, is not surprising in light of the criticism of the
Garmon rule. Members of the Court and legal scholars have criticized it
for almost a decade.52 The first signs of serious dissatisfaction with the
Garmon rule are found in two cases which the Court heard in 1969.
In the first case, International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Ariadne Ship-
ping Co.,'":' three Justices concurred that a Florida court was preempted by
the Board's jurisdiction, but they rejected the view that the reversal should
be based on the "arguably protected" and "arguably prohibited" test of
48. See notes 39 and 40, supra.
49. See note 25, supra.
50. In the state controversy Sears only challenged the location of the picketing whereas the
issue before the Board would have been whether the picketing had a recognitional or work
reassignment objective. 98 S. Ct. 1758.
51. This dictum is consistent with the Court's trend of protection of property rights. See
text at notes 84-88, infra.
52. See Broomfield, Preemptive Federal Jurisdiction Over Concerted Trespassing Union
Activity, 83 HARV. L. REV. 552 (1970); Come, supra note 10; Cox, supra note 10.
53. 397 U.S. 195 (1970)(the Court ruled that Florida state courts were preempted by the
NLRB where the union was picketing to protest substandard wages paid to American work-
men by foreign shipowners).
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Garmon.54 The concurring opinion, which rested reversal on the fact that
the union activity was actually protected by the NLRA, held that the
Garmon rule "should be reconsidered" because an employer faced with
arguably protected picketing had no adequate means of determining
whether the activity was actually protected. 5
In the second case, Taggart v. Weinacker's Inc., 6 Chief Justice Burger,
concurring in the dismissal of a grant of certiorari, seriously questioned the
validity of the Garmon doctrine. The facts in Taggart are analogous to the
facts in Sears. 5 The Chief Justice intimated that the state's trespass law
should be available to enjoin pickets on private property, and expressed
disbelief in the theory that federal preemption on this point was based on
congressional intent."
The most severe indictment of the Garmon decision is found in the
dissenting opinion of Justice White in Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Elec-
tric Employees of America v. Lockridge.5 This decision clearly exposed the
element of unfairness in a strong federally oriented preemption doctrine
which may adversly affect not only employers but employees as well. The
case involved the suspension of Wilson Lockridge, a union member who
had been delinquent in paying his dues. 5 Lockridge, suing in an Idaho
state court, maintained that the union had violated an implied promise in
law by suspending him before it had the right to do so.
The Supreme Court, in a split decision, reversed the Idaho Supreme
Court's affirmance of the trial court's award for compensatory damages
resulting from Lockridge's loss of employment. Applying the Garmon rule,
the Court held that Idaho state courts were preempted because the union's
conduct was arguably protected and arguably prohibited; the majority
opinion deemed it necessary for the Board to interpret the union constitu-
54. Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart, authored the con-
curring opinion. Id. at 201.
55. Id. at 201-02.
56. 397 U.S. 223 (1970).
57. Although there is some indication that the picketing obstructed customers who were
entering and leaving Weinacker's Inc., the picketing was otherwise similar in that it occurred
on the owner's private sidewalk adjacent to his store. Taggart v. Weinacker's Inc., 283 Ala.
171, 214 So. 2d 913 (1968).
58. 397 U.S. 228 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
59. 403 U.S. 274 (1971).
60. Lockridge, the respondent employee and member of petitioner's union, was fired by his
employer at the union's request. The union's constitution provided that a member who did
not pay his dues for two months suspended himself by allowing his arrearage to continue into
the first day of the third month. The union, however, suspended Lockridge in less than two
months after he had failed to pay his dues.
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tion to determine whether the union was guilty of an unfair labor practice."'
The Board, however, was unwilling to make this determination. "2
Justice White's dissenting opinion, with which the Chief Justice con-
curred, severely criticized the outcome of the case and the Garmon rule.
It noted that "[tihe phenomenon of the no man's land. . . cast substan-
tial doubt. . . on the very foundations of Garmon itself.""' The dissenters
pointed to the hiatus created by Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board" and
emphasized the prompt congressional amendment of the NLRA to alle-
viate the problem.5 The Congressional action indicated to the dissenters
that Congress intended to allow states a much larger role in federal labor
policy than that allowed by the majority opinion."
Recent decisions preceding Sears deemphasized strict use of the Garmon
rule. In Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Comm'n, the Court ruled that a second line of preemption
analysis was appropriate in determining whether a union's activity was
amenable to regulation by the states. Although the problem would have
been more easily resolved by ruling that the state's authority was
preempted under Garmon's arguably protected, arguably prohibited test,
the Court, after noting that alternative," chose to use another line of
preemption analysis in overturning the state court ruling.60
61. 403 U.S. at 292-93.
62. Another union member, Elmer Day, similarly suspended and discharged from employ-
ment, had filed a formal charge against the union with the Regional Director of the Board,
but he refused to issue a complaint. Id. at 280, n.3. Since the Board ruling was not with
unclouded legal significance as required by Garmon (359 U.S. 246), Lockridge ultimately was
left in the same position. Day was left without a legal forum to adjudicate his claim.
63. 403 U.S. 315 (White, J., dissenting).
64. 353 U.S. 1 (1957).
65. 403 U.S. 316; See notes 29 and 30 and accompanying text, supra.
66. Justice White cited 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) which allows states to choose between open and
closed shop laws as an example of congressional intent to leave state law intact in the national
labor relations field. 403 U.S. at 317-18. He continued by writing that ". . . for activity that
is arguably protected . . . the Garmon rule blindly preempts other tribunals." Id. at 326. In
drawing a parallel to Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969), he concluded
his dissenting opinion by comparing the predicament of an employer who is faced with union
picketing and no available forum for relief with ". . . the wage earner who finds that claims
of another have cut his take-home pay in half." 403 U.S. at 330-31.
67. 427 U.S. 132 (1976). The Court decided that where a union's concerted refusal to work
overtime as a source of bargaining power in negotiating a new contract with its employer was
determined by the Board to be neither protected nor prohibited by the NLRA then the
Wisconsin Labor Relations Commission was preempted from ruling that the union's conduct
was in violation of state law.
68. Id. at 138-40.
69. "Kearney ... presage[s] an ultimate finding that the 'primary ;iurisdiction' approach
to preemption [developed by Garmon] is no longer of general application." Note, Labor Law
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In another case,70 the Court displayed its willingness to allow states more
leeway in exercising its jurisdiction over matters traditionally within the
Board's jurisdiction. The Court ruled that the Garmon preemption doc-
trine would not be applied inflexibly to deny the plaintiff a state court
forum even though his allegations ". . . form the basis for unfair labor
practice charges before the Board."' The Court was unwilling to dismiss
the case by using a hard line federal oriented preemption approach similar
to the application of the Garmon rule in the Lockridge case.72
The Sears decision is consistent with a trend, spanning almost a decade,
of unwillingness to use a strong federally oriented preemption analysis.
Considered against the backdrop of past criticisms of the Garmon rule, the
Sears decision is consistent with the present Supreme Court's rejection of
the spirit of the Garmon doctrine.
As a result of this shift in judicial attitudes, the Garmon rule itself is
undergoing change. For instance, the peaceful picketing of Sears did not
fall within either of the two exceptions to Garmon as they have been
interpreted in the past. While the Court categorized the picketing of Sears
to be a matter of local interest, 3 previous decisions placing an activity
solely under the local interest exception have involved some form of viol-
ence. These cases have ranged from outrageous conduct, intimidation and
threats to a strong potential for violence. 74 However, in Sears the Court
notes that the picketing was peaceful and that there was prompt compli-
ance with the order to move from the property.75
- Preemption - Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Comm'n (Kearney), 18 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 494, 510 (1977).
70. Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 25, 430 U.S. 290 (1977), vacating and
remanding, Hill v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 49 Cal. App.3d 614, 122 Cal. Rptr. 722
(1975) (plaintiff alleged, inter alia, intentional infliction of mental distress by the union presi-
dent).
71. Id. at 302.
72. In contrast the California Court of Appeals in reversing the verdict for the plaintiff in
Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters used a strict federal oriented preemption analysis. The
court ruled that the "crux" of the case arguably constituted unfair labor practices, and that
regardless of the acts that supported the charge of intentional infliction of mental distress
" . . the federal government has preempted this field and the state courts have no jurisdic-
tion, that jurisdiction to right the alleged wrong is vested in the N.L.R.B." Hill v. United
Bhd. of Carpenters, 49 Cal. App. 3d 614, 620, 122 Cal. Rptr. 722, 725 (1975), vacated and
remanded sub nom. Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 25, 430 U.S. 290 (1977).
73. The Court discussed peaceful trespass in the context of local interest exception cases
and reasoned that in Sears as in those cases (see note 22, supra) the controversy presented to
the state court was different from that which would have been presented before the Board.
98 S. Ct. 1756-58. Therefore in local interest exception cases, e.g. Farmer v. United Bhd. of
Carpenters, the Court felt that there was no undue risk of interference with the NLRB's unfair
labor practice jurisdiction. Id. at 1758.
74. See note 25, supra.
75. 98 S. Ct. 1750. The Court also noted that there is another major distinction between
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B. Preemption of the Protection of Property Rights Revisited
One explanation for the expansion of the local interest exception to the
Garmon rule to accommodate state protection of private property lies in
the Court's reevaluation, in this decade, of the significance of property
rights." Since 1970, the Court has strictly curtailed union use of private
property in contrast to its previous protection of such use.
The NLRA itself made inroads into an employer's proprietary rights."
The Court laid the groundwork for allowing employees to use an employer's
property over his objection as early as 1945.78 NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox
Co.71 is the leading case in which the Supreme Court set forth the test for
balancing an employer's proprietary rights against a union's organizational
rights. The Court in an 8-0 decision held:80
This is not a problem of always open or always closed doors for union
organization on company property. Organization rights arn granted to work-
ers by the same authority, the National Government, that preserves property
rights.
[Wlhen the inaccessibility of employees makes ineffective the reasonable
attempts by nonemployees to communicate with them through the usual
channels, [of personal contacts, letters, and telephone calls], the right to
exclude them from property has been required to yield to the extent needed
to permit communication of information on the right to organize.
Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza Inc.,81
Sears and the other cases within the local interest exception - none of the other cases within
the exception involved protected conduct whereas a violation of a trespass law may be pro-
tected under section 7. Id. at 1761.
76. Though the Court was undoubtedly concerned with the harsh effect of the Garmon rule
where it deprived an employer of his "day in Court," due to the pervasive reference to cases
and principles relating to the property rights of employers in section V of the opinion this
area merits exploration.
77. Sections 7 and 8(a)(1) have given employees and non-employees alike the right to use
an employer's land against his wishes. See Cox, supra note 7, at 1360-61.
78. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945)(a rule against solicitation on
an employer's premises during the employee's own time was held invalid and a discharge from
employment as "a result of the rule's violation required reinstatement of the employee). Cf.
NLRB v. S. & H. Grossingers, Inc., 372 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1967)(employer must let non-
employee union organizers on his premises where he operated a resort hotel at which employ-
ees resided); NLRB v. Lake Superior Lumber Corp., 167 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1948) (where union
organizers must have access to the employer's premises or be seriously handicapped in organi-
zational activity).
79. 351 U.S. 105 (1956)(an employer was required to allow non-employee union organizers
to come on his property and distribute union literature to his employees).
80. Id. at 112. The Court also ruled that the accommodation between the two rights must
be obtained with as little destruction of one right as is consistent with the maintenance of
the other. Id.
81. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
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marks the furthest extent the Court has allowed unions to organize workers
on an employer's private property. The Court ruled that picketing fell
under the first and fourteenth amendment right of freedom of speech and
expression which could not be circumscribed. The Court analogized a
shopping center to a municipal business district 2 and the opinion held that
state trespass laws were not to be invoked to deprive union pickets of their
first amendment rights. The Court as of 1968 definitely favored the right
to peacefully picket on private property over the state's right to protect the
private property of its citizens."'
In recent years, however, the Court has severely restricted Logan Valley
and has shown an unwillingness to liberally interpret the Babcock decision
allowing unions the right to use an employer's property. Following Logan
Valley, the Supreme Court began to allow employers greater latitude in
restricting the use of their private property to union activity. The Court
in Lloyd Corp. v. Tannere4 limited the Logan Valley decision by restricting
the analogy of a shopping center to a municipal business district. The
Court then" moved to restrict a union's solicitation rights when they were
exercised on an employer's property.A5 In doing so the Burger Court empha-
sized that long settled rights of private property protected by the fifth and
fourteenth amendments militated against allowing a union to use an em-
ployer's property against his wishes. Briefly stated, union solicitation on
private property appeared to be no longer constitutionally protected.
Hudgens v. NLRB 7 laid to rest any remaining doubts about the viability
82. The opinion depended, in large part, on Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) for
support. In Marsh the Court held that it was unconstitutional for Jehovah's Witnesses to be
prevented from handbilling on the main business block of a company-owned town.
83. As one commentator noted shortly after the decision was handed down, "[ailthough
the first amendment is not directly relevant to controversies involving rights granted under
section 7 of the NLRA, Logan Valley indicates that there has been a steady decline in the
significance of 'naked title' since the decision in Babcock & Wilcox." See Broomfield, supra
note 52, at 554.
84. 407 U.S. 551, 569 (1972)(Vietnam draft and war protestors were ruled to have no right
to handbill in a privately-owned shopping center where the handbilling was unrelated to the
shopping center's operations). After Logan Valley the Court held that property does not "...
lose its private character merely because the public is generally invited to use it for designated
purposes." Id. at 569.
85. In Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539 (1972), the Supreme Court was pre-
sented with a case involving non-employee union organizers' rights to solicit membership for
its union on an employer's parking lot. The Court rejected the argument that the first amend-
ment protected union solicitation on the employer's parking lot. The Court ruled that the
public property concept promulgated in Marsh v. Alabama was different from property such
as Central Hardware's which was merely "open to the public." Id. at 547.
86. Id.
87. 424 U.S. 507 (1976)(pickets paraded in an enclosed mall in front of a satellite store of
the petitioner's main store which was being struck by an employees' union).
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of Logan Valley and held that the union had no first amendment right to
picket a privately owned shopping center unless its picketing was protected
by the NLRB.
The Sears decision, in citing the Babcock criteria for allowing union
organizational activity on private property and the Hudgens decision al-
lowing protection of union organizational activity only under the NLRA,
is consistent with the current Supreme Court trend in protecting private
property rights. The holding gives the employer a forum in which he can
protect his property interests. It also indicates that a majority of the pres-
ent Court is reluctant to find union organizational activity on private
property protected in the future."
IV. IMPLICATIONS
In the wake of the Sears ruling, several important issues remain to be
decided. Most important is whether state court jurisdiction will be
preempted upon the mere filing of a section 8 charge with the Board.
Justice Blackmun, in his concurring opinion, interpreted Sears to mean
that state court jurisdiction is preempted when a union merely files a
section 8 complaint with the Board against an employer.'' Justice Powell
disagreed with this interpretation of the majority opinion and stated that
state court jurisdiction is not to be preempted upon the filing of a charge
by the union.'
Both Justices' views will be important in the future because the question
was not addressed in the majority opinion. In a footnote to the Court's
opinion Justice Stevens wrote "the Board's jurisdiction could have been
invoked . . .even after the litigation in the state court had commenced
... ,,12 Justice Stevens cited two cases to buttress this rule. The first
case, NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co.,93 held that it was proper for the Board to
have a federal court restrain the enforcement of a state court injunction
which regulated conduct governed exclusively by the NLRB.9 Capital
88. Id. at 519-21.
89. This judicial philosophy held by a majority of the Court helps to account for the reason
the Court was willing to place peaceful picketing within the local interest exception when no
other cases within that exception involve protected conduct under the Act, and they involve
some form of violence or intimidation. See notes 25 and 75, supra.
90. 98 S. Ct. 1764 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun added that the union
must ". . . process the charge expeditiously" and state courts may resume jurisdiction if the
Board's General Counsel declines to issue a complaint or finds the picketing to be unpro-
tected. Id.
91. 98 S. Ct. 1766 (Powell, J., concurring).
92. Id. at 1763, n.43.
93. 404 U.S. 138 (1971).
94. The State court injunction sought to regulate non-employee union picketing activity.
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Services, Inc. v. NLRB1 5 is the second case on which Justice Stevens relied
to imply that after a state court began adjudication of a union trespass it
could be preempted by the Board. However, both cases involved preemp-
tion of a state court proceeding after the Board had determined a violation
of the NLRA had occurred.
Whether the state is preempted before the controversy is heard by the
NLRB, that is at a mere request by the union for a complaint to be issued,
remains to be decided. Justice Blackmun's view, that mere filing of a
charge preempts state jurisdiction, is based on a fear of state abuse in
determining labor disputes." Justice Blackmun would preempt the states'
jurisdiction from the time of filing of a charge up until the time the Board
declined to file a complaint.
In contrast, Justice Powell held that a state court is not preempted by
the filing of a complaint because a jurisdictional hiatus would exist until
the General Counsel decided whether to issue a complaint. Justice Powell
notes that with the filing of a charge "nothing is likely to happen 'in a
timely fashion.' ,g The possibility of violence caused by an employer
driven to use self-help to remove pickets from his property governs against
preemption in Justice Powell's view." This question remains to be resolved
by the Court.
Justice Stevens' majority opinion also takes note of what may be termed
a technical loophole in the NLRB's rulings which favors employers. The
Court recognizes that the Board presently takes the position that an em-
ployer's resort to court action is not a violation of section 8(a)(1).11 If a
state's trespass law does not require the owner to ask the trespassor to leave
The Court stated, in ruling that the injunction should have been issued by the federal court,
"[i]t has long been held that the Board, though not granted express statutory remedies, may
obtain appropriate and traditional ones to prevent frustration of the purposes of the Act."
Id. at 142.
95. 347 U.S. 501 (1954). In Capital Services a union was seeking to unionize the employer's
workers and in doing so it engaged in secondary picketing of the employer's customers. The
Court upheld a federal court's issuance of two injunctions. The first one restrained the em-
ployer from enforcing a state court injunction and the second restrained the union's conduct
until the employer's section 8 charge was adjudicated by the Board.
96. See note 17, supra and accompanying text. Justice Blackmun also expressed concern
over giving unions a prompt hearing which was apparently not accorded to the union in the
Sears case. See note 41, supra.
97. 98 S. Ct. 1766.
98. Perhaps the "logical corollary" to the Sears case, given the trend of increased protec-
tion of property rights and affording litigants a forum, is that preemption should not occur
until the Board issues a complaint.
99. NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138 (1971); Clyde Taylor Co., 127 N.L.R.B. 103,
45 LRRM 1514 (1960); Cf. Cove Tankers Corp., No. 76-1633, 97 L.R.R.M. 3083 (1978)(law
suits must be filed in complete good faith).
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before filing suit the employer could seek relief in state court without
giving the union an opportunity to seek Board protection for its picketing
because the employer's action in state court is not an unfair labor practice.
Although dictum'0 counsels against the constitutionality of this approach,
the option remains to be tested.
V. CONCLUSION
The Sears decision has resolved the jurisdictional dilemma which had
been recognized but ignored by both the Warren Court and the Burger
Court for over two decades. As a result of the Sears ruling, an employer
may appear before a state tribunal and obtain a temporary restraining
order at the outset of labor picketing instead of having to wait several
weeks before the Board can hear his charge. Whether the state court is
preempted upon the mere filing of an unfair labor practice charge by a
union is a question that remains to be answered. Given the trend of criticiz-
ing the strong federal preemption doctrine and the reevaluation of property
rights which the Court has followed for the past decade it would not be
surprising if a future ruling established that state court jurisdiction is not
preempted upon the mere filing of an unfair labor practice charge.
Keith Barker
100. 98 S. Ct. 1763, n.44.
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